

An Ontology Series

Issue 3

**The War and Peace
Of
A
New
Ontological
Perception**



God

Boethius

Symbiotic Panentheism

and

Free Will
(Responsibility)



Daniel J. Shepard

Ontological Series

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Boethius
Symbiotic Panentheism
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


Resolving the Paradox Regarding:


- **Divine Foreknowledge Void Free Will**
- **Free Will Void Divine Foreknowledge**
- **Free Will Void the Laws of Nature**

Daniel J. Shepard


Boethius helps us understand



Symbiotic panentheism helps us understand Free Will



1. 525 AD Boethius – The Error of:
Free Will – a new perception 2000 AD



The error: The paradox of free will and divine foreknowledge

The perception: Boethius moves our perceptual understanding regarding the system being filled with free will into that of being 'the' system filled with both free will and divine foreknowledge. As such, free will and divine foreknowledge, with the help of Boethius, now have a location within which they can be found. However, the understanding regarding the role of both free will and divine foreknowledge as well as the understanding regarding the interrelationship between free will and divine foreknowledge not only remain in a state of confusion but even more disconcerting, the existence of such an interrelationship is not recognized as a significant aspect of the 'larger' system.

It is this state of this confusion which will be specifically addressed within this tractate.

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Boethius – The Error of

- **Divine Foreknowledge Void Free Will**
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Part I: Creating the paradox of ‘the’ System ‘containing’ free will

Introduction

Free will confined within the boundaries of determinism is simply an illusion of free will.

‘There can be little question that Boethius, more than any other philosophic author, helped the great Schoolmen to retain a general comprehensive view of the world as a whole, in spite of the distractions of their minute inquiries.’¹

Boethius presented humanity with a model of a metaphysical system, which led to an understanding regarding how it is men retain free will within the parameters of an all-knowing entity. Boethius’ metaphysical system describes an omniscient God and It’s interrelationship to free will. Examination of Boethius’ metaphysical system becomes the point of the first part of this tractate. The second part of this tractate is an examination of a means by which we can embrace such a system while freeing ourselves of the contradiction divine foreknowledge, determinism, pre-destination, or predestination impose upon the very concept of ‘free’ will.

Paradoxically, the process of freeing ourselves of the confines of determinism is accomplished through a process of removing free will from the realm of determinism and then reinserting free will back into determinism through a process of ‘separation through inclusion’ versus ‘separation

through exclusion'. The exploration of 'separation through inclusion' versus 'separation through exclusion' is itself fully explored in Tractate 8: Russell. Although the in depth understanding regarding the concept of 'separation through inclusion' must wait for the Russell Tractate, we will initiate the understanding regarding such a concept within this tractate.

Boethius argued we must accept free will as being recessive, submissive to divine foreknowledge, determinism, pre-destination, and predestination. Now if submissive independence is not an error, what is?

Is Boethius to blame for our having been able to resolve the paradox regarding free will and divine foreknowledge?

The answer is no. We are now the ones responsible for not resolving the issue regarding the paradox of the simultaneous independent existence of free will and determinism. Philosophers have expanded our understanding of abstraction and scientists have expanded our understanding of the physical. Now it is up to us to merge the two sets of knowledge. We have the knowledge. Therefore, it is up to present day metaphysicians to assemble these pieces of the puzzle and create a new metaphysical model.

An alternative metaphysical perception, metaphysical model, to Boethius' metaphysical perception exists. The problem is to gain the attention of religion, philosophy, and science, all of who have rejected the very validity of metaphysics itself.

With this in mind, let's examine what it was Boethius laid out for us as a metaphysical perception. Let us then proceed to examine why this metaphysical system was accepted as a logical argument. We will then examine why such a metaphysical model advanced intact through history followed by an examination as to why it is we have not yet discarded this metaphysical system. Finally, let us examine why it is we can now file Boethius' system away as an interesting perception found within the annals of philosophical history as opposed to its status of being an unresolved perplexing paradox of philosophical perception.

A misconception of determinism

Determinism and free will are perceived to be the two states of being/action found only 'within' process - reality (vb). This is a limited perception. It is a perception of 'confinement'. In order to expand our perception regarding free will and determinism, it will help to examine the types of action, which appear to exist.

There appear to be three types of action correlating to the three regions of truth, the existence of 'relativistic truth' as explored in the previous tractate: Tractate 2: Aristotle and Cartesian Systems.

Action can be categorized as either active or passive.

In terms of action, there is being/action in the active sense and being/action in the passive sense. This statement suggests only two forms of action rather than three forms of action. Upon closer examination, however, one finds each of these two forms of action, these two forms of being/action are themselves subdivided into two subgroups.

Doesn't such a statement imply there are in fact only two forms of action? No, there are four forms of action, which emerge from the two primary sets of action. Each of these four forms of action is not themselves relegated to a lesser significance than the two sets from which they emerge. It is the action itself, which 'is' as opposed to the two sets within which they can be categorized.

Understanding Boethius requires only the examination of three of the four forms of action. It is for this reason Part I: The Introduction of this tractate suggests there are three forms of action. Understanding the resolution to the paradoxical independent existence of free will and determinism requires the examination of all four forms of action. It is for this reason Part II: Resolving Boethius' Paradox deals with four versus three forms of action.

Part I deals with three regions within which ‘a’ unique truth can be found to exist.


Part II expands upon this understanding to include not three but four regions, not three unique truths but four unique truths. In fact, it might better be said: Each of the four action forms dominates a particular ‘region’ of ‘location and that ‘a’ unique truth exists as ‘a’ unique dominate form of action, which ‘gives’ the ‘region’ its unique innate characteristics.

Such a statement, however, is misleading for it would better be said that each region of first truth evolves an innate characteristic through the primary action found to dominate the region itself.

To begin understanding the means of resolving Boethius’ paradox, we must first examine Boethius’ metaphysical system in terms of three action forms.

Three forms of action

Before naming the three forms of action, it will help to briefly examine the three ‘regions’, which contain their own unique 1st truth. The in-depth examination of such an understanding was explored in Tractate 2: Aristotle and Cartesian Systems.



Having identified three ‘locations’, we can list three action forms. We can then demonstrate why it is we find such action existing as an innate characteristic of the region. We can demonstrate how it is first truth is first truth while being within first truth only from the point of view of the region itself. In short, we will both demonstrate what is meant by the term ‘relativistic first truth’ examined in Tractate 2: Aristotle and Cartesian Systems and demonstrate how ‘relativistic first truth’ can resolve the paradox of the independent existence of free will and determinism.

Action:


I. Passive action

1. Action bound by the laws of nature
2. Action bound by the laws of determinism

II. Active action

3. Action bound by the laws of free will

Expanding upon our diagram through the placement of action, we obtain:



And why is it actions found bound by the laws of nature and actions bound by the laws of determinism are both considered to be 'passive' forms of action? Action bound by the laws of nature and actions bound by the laws of determinism are both 'predetermined' and as such, they are not 'free' but 'bound' to be what they are.

This is not to imply actions bound by the laws of nature are each proceeded by conscious 'intent' to have the action be what it is. Rather it implies that the laws of nature determine action naturally.

Within a system of divine foreknowledge, it could be said: Actions bound by the laws of free will are also 'bound'. Such a perception, however, evolves out of a perception that being 'bounded' by the lack of control of one's action is a form of control itself. Such a perception is correct. However, it is not correct in the sense one may first think. Actions bounded by the laws of nature and actions bounded by the laws of determinism are forms of 'controlled actions', which lie 'outside' the realm of one's control. Actions bound by the laws of free will are by definition 'controlled' in the sense that they are not controlled by a source 'outside' one's control but rather controlled by one's self.

The question then arises: What do we call states of the individual? Such existence is said to simple 'be' without action. In essence, there is no action to such forms of existence found within the physical universe. A rock exists, an atom exists, and a star exists. These are forms the individual often referred to as states of being as opposed to states of action.

One may object and point out that a star is a dynamic object. It is in essence a summation of many states of action. Fusion is but one such process taking place 'within' the star. This form of action does not apply just to the star however. The rock is composed of its own unique forms of action. Atomic vibration, subatomic particle movement, heat exchange, electromagnetic interactions, etc. 'fill' the rock with action no less than the star is 'filled' with action, states of active being.

These states of action are not forms of determinism. These forms of actions are actions bound by the 'laws' of nature. Such actions are discoverable through observation and measurement. We call such action, actions bound by the laws of nature. Laws of nature are not only predictable but lend themselves to a concept known as formulation. Formulation is simply a predictable pattern capable of being expressed through a mathematical equation. We may not have the mathematical sophistication capable of predicting all such actions but there is no denying we are working diligently on developing just such a level of sophistication. We may not have the time to develop this level of mathematical sophistication. The concept of limited time, however, is not stopping us from exploring such mathematical formulations.

Such states of being/action, process – reality are not examples of determinism. They are instead actions generated by the laws of nature, which are inherent in our universe. Such actions are universal to our universe because they exist within a universe where such laws 'rule'. It is very possible such laws of nature may not exist in another universe. It is possible other universes abide by different 'laws' or lack of 'laws' as we might perceive an existence lacking 'rules' to be.

We are not, however, here to discuss unique possibilities regarding a variety of existences potentially found within unique universes. We are here to understand our personal universe. Part of understanding our universe, understanding ourselves, understanding the whole, understanding the interactions of the three lies in understanding action.

Actions bound by the 'laws' of nature are not forms of determinism nor are they forms of free will, they are rather just what they were stated to be, actions bound by the 'laws' of nature.

What are actions classified as forms of determinism and what are actions classified as forms of free will? Actions of determinism and actions of free will are actions, which are not bound by the 'laws' of nature.

Newton identified three basic laws of action, as well as inaction. Inaction is an extreme form of action. Inaction is the purest form of minimalistic action found on the extreme end of the action continuum.

Newton's laws² of motion/action existing 'within' nature:

1. A body continues in a state of rest or uniform motion in a straight line unless it is acted upon by external forces.
2. The rate of change of momentum of a moving body is proportional to and in the same direction as the force action on it, *i.e.* $F=d(mv)/dt$, where F is the applied force, ' v ' is the velocity of the body, and ' m ' its mass. If the mass remains constant, $F = mdv/dt$ or $\bar{F} = ma$, where ' a ' is the acceleration.
3. If one body exerts a force on another, there is an equal and opposite force, called a reaction, exerted on the first body by the second.

Actions of determinism and actions of free will are distinguishable from forms of action or inaction bound by the laws of nature. If one jumps off a cliff, they will fall. The process of falling, the action of falling is bound by the 'law of nature'. The decision to jump is a case of personal choice. One decides to jump or not to jump.


It is the issue of choice being an option or not being an option, which is to be addressed in this article. It is the issue of whether the book of life 'is already written' or whether the book of life 'is in the process of being written' which is to be examined in this tractate. It is the development of a new means of 'looking' at, of perceiving the function of determinism existing simultaneously with, yet independently from, free will. It is the intent of this article to demonstrate that not only do the two, free will and determinism, exist uniquely and simultaneously but they do so in a critically interdependent fashion.

The concept regarding a critical interdependence of free will and determinism establishes a metaphysical system wherein determinism and free will are dependent upon each other for their very existence as unique forms of action.


But what of actions bound by the ‘laws of nature’? Actions bound by the laws of nature will find themselves addressed in detail throughout this work. One need but revert to Tractate 1: Zeno and Seamlessness to find such an example. Within Tractate 1, one can find a detailed discussion regarding a region where an understanding emerges regarding the ‘real’ being simultaneously a ‘real illusion’ and the ‘real illusion’ being simultaneously the ‘real’.

Limits placed upon Boethius


To understand Boethius’ metaphysical system one must understand the place in history Boethius occupied. Boethius followed Aristotle. It was Aristotle who, as we discussed in Tractate 2, closed the ‘region’ we call reality.



Boethius was therefore faced with one and only one choice in terms of where to place all action, be they actions bound by the laws of free will or actions bound by the laws of determinism.



This is better understood if we diagram it as:



The diagram demonstrates there being no 'outside' to 'reality'. Why is there no 'outside' to Boethius' 'observable' reality? There is no outside to physical reality because Aristotle closed it off from rational perceptual examination through the process of establishing a subconscious acceptance of the concept: 'Seeing is believing.'

The result of Aristotle's action: Free will and determinism found themselves immersed 'within' the universe and only the universe. As such, humanity had no choice but to reconcile the apparently contradictory actions classified as free will and determinism.

The process of finding a solution to the apparent paradoxical coexistence of free will and determinism existing simultaneously within the same location was the fundamental objective Boethius attempted to establish in his work: Boethius – The Consolation of Philosophy. The problem Boethius confronted, however, emerged from the limits within which Boethius found himself. Boethius found himself limited to 'a' reality comprised of the physical. As such, Boethius found himself limited to developing a means of reconciling the existence of free will and determinism 'within' the limits of a 'physical system'.

An in depth examination of the paradox Boethius generated regarding the coexistence of free will and determinism can better be understood after having refreshed oneself with a few of Boethius' thoughts extracted from his tractate: The Consolation of Philosophy.

Some thoughts expounded by Boethius

Boethius: The Consolation of Philosophy

Book V, section III:

‘Look,’ I said, ‘there is something even more difficult I find perplexing and confusing.

‘Tell me,’ she said, ‘though I can guess what is troubling you.’

‘Well, the two seem clean contrary and opposite, God’s universal foreknowledge and freedom of the will. If God foresees all things and cannot be mistaken in any way, what Providence has foreseen as a future event must happen. So that if from eternity Providence foreknows not only men’s actions but also their thoughts and desires, there will be no freedom of will. No action or desire will be able to exist other than that which God’s infallible Providence has foreseen. For if they can be changed and made different from how they were foreseen, there will be no sure foreknowledge of the future, only an uncertain opinion; and this I do not think can be believed of God....

Book V, section IV:

Then Philosophy spoke. ‘This is an old complaint about Providence.

‘It cannot be that what is foreseen as a future event does not come to pass. It would be as if we believed that what Providence foreknows as future events are not going to happen, instead of believing that although they happen, they were not predestined in their own nature. You will easily be able to see it in this way; we see many things before our eyes as they happen, like the actions we see

charioteers performing in order to control and drive their chariots, and other things of this sort. But no necessity forces any of them to happen in this way, does it?

...’Therefore, all those things which happen without happening of necessity are, before they happen, future events about to happen, but not about to happen of necessity. For just as the knowledge of present things imposes no necessity on what is happening, so foreknowledge imposes no necessity on what is going to happen.

‘The cause of this mistake is that people think that the totality of their knowledge depends on the nature and capacity to be known of the objects of knowledge. But this is all wrong.’...

‘The point of greatest importance here is this: the superior manner of knowledge includes the inferior, but it is quite impossible for the inferior to rise to the superior.’...

‘In the same way, human reason refuses to believe that divine intelligence can see the future in any other way except that in which human reason has knowledge.’...

Herein lies the crux of Boethius’ argument, we, humans must accept his argument for it supposedly rises above human rationality and flows into the rationality of God, approximates God’s rationality which is and forever will be unknowable to us.

In short, Boethius is saying: It is so even if we cannot comprehend it. And just what is ‘it’? ‘It’ is the perception: ‘In the same way, human reason refuses to believe that divine intelligence can see the future in any other way except that in which human reason has knowledge...For just as the

knowledge of present things imposes no necessity on what is happening, so foreknowledge imposes no necessity on what is going to happen.’

According to Boethius, divine foreknowledge, existing simultaneously with legitimate free will, is what it is. Such a concept reduces free will to a state of irrationality. The simultaneous existence of free will existing as free will even though the actions are pre-known is to be accepted as free will because Boethius has decided that such a state of existence is a primary theorem. As we can see from the previous quotes, Boethius tells us such a basic premise is to be accepted as a non-debatable theorem. Why is it Boethius claims we must accept, without debate, such a theorem? We must accept such a theorem because the theorem resolves the paradox of free will existing simultaneously with divine foreknowledge.

Such a perception is proposed as an ironclad theorem of metaphysics because it establishes a means of creating a rational understanding of an irrational position. In essence, Boethius attempted to rationalize an irrational metaphysical position. We cannot completely fault Boethius. There is no denying that Aristotle’s perception of the physical universe existing, as ‘the’ system is a very tempting metaphysical system to embrace.


Aristotle established the scientific perception of there being ‘a’ singular location of existence. Aristotle established the scientific perception of there being ‘a’ location bound ‘within’ the physical, bound by the limits of the physical, confined by the limits of the physical. There is little doubt that such a metaphysical system is very difficult to refute since we can ‘see’/observe this metaphysical system.

Only an observable system, a physical system, is ‘provable’ through observation/measurement, an action of the physical itself. Abstraction is not measurable. Abstraction itself is not observable. What is observable in terms of abstraction is the affect abstraction has upon the awareness found within the physical. Free will and determinism are not the action itself but

rather intent, which initiates action found within the physical. This is what is meant by: Free will being confined within the same boundaries, as determinism.

Boethius' metaphysical system

Boethius' metaphysical system displays free will as being confined within the same boundaries as determinism.



It is obvious from the metaphysical system diagrammed that the three forms of action must be reconciled metaphysically in terms of their interrelationships 'within' such a system.

To assist us in understanding the three forms of action we will examine the three forms of action through a series of diagrams:

Key:



Action 1: Actions bound by the laws of nature




Action 2: Actions bound by the laws of free will




Action 3: Actions bound by the laws of determinism

Boethius' metaphysical system placed all three forms of action 'within' the same container and shook up the three forms of action until they were completely emulsified. As such, the appearance of equality of action emerged. As with all emulsions, however, if one 'waits' long enough, the emulsion of action will eventually separate into layers of relative value.

Such a process would take on the following initial appearance:




This, over time, settles into its various layers of value and becomes:




Within Boethius' metaphysical system, determinism becomes level one for without levels, two and three being predetermined by level one levels two and three could not exist. Level two, a location for level three, becomes level two for without level two level three has no 'place' to be and as such could not exist.

The graphic of Boethius' metaphysical system, when viewed from the point of perception regarding higher levels of value, higher levels of dominance of one over the other, becomes:



This form of categorizing action provides the logic of accepting, as well as provides the means of understanding how it is determinism could exist 'within' a region of free will. This form of categorizing action provides an understanding as to how it is possible for one form of action, free will, to fall 'under' the influence of determinism through the action of determinism superceding free will. An example of just such a situation would be one forcefully holding the hand of another on a hot stove. This action supercedes the desired action of the victim and thus the concept of 'victim itself emerges.

Within Boethius' metaphysical system, what happens to the concept of 1st truth? First truth precedes the 'levels' generated by such a system:



But, one may say: How could it be that first truth does not correlate to anything other than what Boethius suggests? Boethius used the metaphysical system Aristotle suggested: The physical is real and the physical is 'the' system. Isn't that in fact why 1st truth is called 1st truth? Doesn't the concept of there being 'a' single location of existence itself suggest there is 'a' singular 1st truth to which this system can be reduced?

As we shall see in the next few sections, the answer to both questions is 'Yes' if we apply Boethius' 'layers' of truth to the Aristotelian metaphysical system of 'a' location of existence being the universe itself, being physical existence itself.

As we shall see in Part II, the answer to both questions is 'No' if we apply an independent location for each form of action for there are not three 'locations' of existence equating to three forms of action but rather there are four locations independent of each other equating to four forms of action.

Boethius' metaphysical system and social acceptance

Boethius' metaphysical system appears to provide the understanding necessary regarding the paradox of omniscience and free will existing simultaneously. Boethius' system provides the rational explanation regarding the contradictory simultaneous existence of an 'all knowing' whole and men having 'control' of their lives. Boethius appears to provide an understanding regarding why men are responsible for their actions in the presence of divine foreknowledge.

However, does Boethius' metaphysical system really provide answers regarding the contradictory simultaneous existence of free will and divine foreknowledge – predestined results, or is Boethius' metaphysical system simply a system which attempts to do so while falling short of the mark?

Is there any other choice? Is there any other metaphysical system, which solves the paradox? Is there any metaphysical system which would remain standing once we applied Ockham's Razor to an alternative solution regarding 'free will' and divine foreknowledge, omniscience', existing simultaneously?

Presently there is no other alternative metaphysical system other than Aristotle's metaphysical system of there being only one location of existence. As such, even today, we still perceive Boethius' solution to be 'the' solution to the paradox of free will and divine foreknowledge existing simultaneously. Thus:

'There can be little question that Boethius, more than any other philosophic author, helped the great Schoolmen to retain a general comprehensive view of the world as a whole, in spite of the distractions of their minute inquiries. '3

remains the order of the day.

And so it is we continue to accept Boethius' solution:

'In the same way, human reason refuses to believe that divine intelligence can see the future in any other way except that in which human reason has knowledge.'...

Boethius' metaphysical system and perpetual historical acceptance

Historically we had little choice but to accept Boethius' metaphysical system for we had no 'place' else to place either 'free will' or 'determinism' or 'free will and determinism' for that matter.

Until we understand the concept of multiple locations of existence, we 'will' continued to accept Boethius' solution:

'In the same way, human reason refuses to believe that divine intelligence can see the future in any other way except that in which human reason has knowledge.'...

Boethius' metaphysical system and why it is we have not presently discarded

We presently have no choice but to accept Boethius' metaphysical argument regarding the contradictory simultaneous existence of free will and determinism existing 'within' the confines of a physical universe for the very confines of the physical is 'the' location Aristotle recognized as being 'existence', 'the' existence.

We remain 'boxed in'. We insist upon following the primary principle of science that if one cannot measure it, it has no validity in terms of 'existing'.⁴ As such, we relegate faith and reason; two means we have of developing truth, understanding truth, to the level of being

second-rate perceptual tools. Because we perceive faith and reason to be second-class perceptual tools, we submit to the perception of observation/science being ‘the’ only ‘true’ perceptual tool we have in our arsenal of perceptual weapons. We ‘believe’, have faith in, and we think it is ‘rational’, reasonable, that our understanding of the whole and of our, individualities’ relationship to the whole is comprehensible only through what it is we ‘see’, what it is we can measure.

Where does this leave us in terms of our present perceptions regarding the contradictory simultaneous existence of the individual’s free will and the whole’s divine foreknowledge? It leaves us in the same state of confusion regarding the interrelationship of determinism and free will as we experienced over fifteen hundred years ago:

‘In the same way, human reason refuses to believe that divine intelligence can see the future in any other way except that in which human reason has knowledge.’...

In short, we remain frustrated. We continue to fall back upon the argument: ‘Get used to it, because that’s just the way it is.’

Part II: Resolving the issue with a new metaphysical perception

The wall of perception

‘It is not allowed to man to comprehend in thought all the ways of the divine work.’⁵

So it is our debates, regarding religion, begins. So it is our predisposition regarding ontological rationality emerges. All our debates regarding ontological, cosmological, and metaphysical discussions begin with a conscious or subconscious foundation that: ‘It is not allowed to man to comprehend in thought all the ways of the divine work.’

This is no way to begin a discussion regarding the concept of 1st truth. This is no way to begin a discussion of 1st principle. Who would dispute the concept that we ‘cannot ‘know’ truth to be ‘truth’. However, just as surely as no one would deny we may not be able to ‘know’ truth to be truth, no one would profess we are incapable of defining 1st truth, 1st principle, as best we can. Having defined 1st truth, we are then capable of proceeding with the dialectic regarding the defined truth and the impact such a defined truth has upon our universe, the whole, and ourselves.

Without the acknowledgement of our being able to define ‘truth’ as best we can and moving on from that point, all science collapses. Without the acknowledgement of our being able to define ‘truth’ as best we can and moving on from there, all faiths evaporate. Without the acknowledgement of our being able to define ‘truth’ as best we can and moving on with life itself, all reason becomes sheer irrationality itself.

Time after time our religious, scientific, and philosophical opinions fall back upon the ultimate point of view we throw in the path of arguments persistently eroding away at our bastions of

reason, faith, and observation: 'It is not allowed to man to comprehend in thought all the ways of the divine work.'

If we have in fact reached the limits of metaphysical philosophical arguments, it is not because there is no infinitely expansive realm of metaphysics left to be explored. If a metaphysical limit has been reached it is because we have defined the further limits of metaphysics to be nonexistent through the proclamation that: 'It is not allowed to man to comprehend in thought all the ways of the divine work.'

Boethius' words: 'It is not allowed to man to comprehend in thought all the ways of the divine work.' Are repeated over and over because they themselves are the words describing the barrier which keeps us separated from the great expanse of creativity regarding our further understanding the interactions and interrelationships between the individual/individuality, being/action, process – reality, and God/the whole.

As such, within this tractate, within this work, we are going to reject the concept of: 'It is not allowed to man to comprehend in thought all the ways of the divine work.' while at the same time accepting its basic premise. This may sound contradictory but it is not. In essence, what we are going to do is accept that while the statement, '...man may not be able to comprehend in thought 'all' the ways of divine work.', we are going to presume that any questions man is capable of initiating, man is capable of resolving. The only limits man is incapable of understanding are limits man is incapable of defining.

This is an exciting principle. It is the very principle that establishes as well as accepts humanity's purpose in terms of leaning and humanity's purpose in terms of gaining knowledge will never come to an end as long as 'the' universe exists. Such a principle establishes: If one loves the pursuit of knowledge, as it appears our specie does, then one need never agonize as regards potentially approaching the end of the learning process.

With this in mind, we have little choice but to accept the concept that free will may in fact exist independent of determinism and vice versa, determinism may in fact exist independent of free will. In fact, we may have little choice but to accept the fact that both statements exist as ‘truths’ simultaneously.

How can we make such a statement when it appears we have apparently rejected just such a statement through our initial rejection of Boethius’ metaphysical perception regarding the simultaneous existence of free will and divine foreknowledge?

The very perception of the simultaneous existence of:

1. Free will existing independent of determinism
while
2. Determinism exists independent of free will

is where the essence of this tractate lies. How can this be the essence of this tractate if the point of this tractate is to dismantle the issue of determinism and free will existing simultaneously as Boethius professes them to be? It is not the concept regarding the very existence of free will, divine foreknowledge, and the universe, which are being questioned. Rather what is being questioned, is the limited confinement itself, the limits we place upon such concepts that are being challenged within this tractate.

Boethius asserted that we could create a solution regarding the two concepts: free will and determinism, through the process of mixing the two. Try as we might over the last 1500 years, we have been unable to create a ‘solution’ regarding the two. We have only been able to create a mixture of the two.

A true solution of free will and determinism would create a system where each is independent of the other yet a system where each is dependent upon what the other has to offer. More

contradictions? The statement is only a contradiction if one retains our present philosophical orientation of being ‘enclosed’ within ‘a’ system rather than being ‘enclosed’ within a system, which finds itself in turn enclosed within a system.

We have a perception regarding a metaphysical system in place. One aspect of the perception we have in place was alluded to via Zeno. Aristotle identified a second aspect of the perception. Boethius then began the process of introducing a contradictory perception, which confused the issue regarding the simultaneous existence of free will and determinism. Boethius embraces Zeno’s self-stated assertions of uncertainty as well as Aristotle’s arguments regarding the universe being the only ‘location’ of the action.

In order to embrace both Zeno and Aristotle, Boethius strongly suggests that free will and ‘divine foreknowledge’ are compatible in the form of adjacent actions of multiplicity found ‘within’ a region of multiplicity itself.

The complexity of such a statement requires the application of Ockham’s razor in order to reduce the statement to a more intelligible form. If the statement is unintelligible as it is, why make the statement in the first place? The statement is made because it accurately represents where we as philosophers presently find ourselves. Boethius led us into such depths of confusion. Boethius led us into the blind alley. However, can we really lay the blame upon Boethius for our being mired in the perpetual cyclical argument:

‘It is not allowed to man to comprehend in thought all the ways of the divine work.’

We cannot, in good conscious, ‘blame’ Boethius for our previous inability to break out of the catch 22 within which we find our present metaphysical thought


We, you and I and you and I together, willingly, through the process of free will, accept Boethius’ presumptions. We embrace such a perception under the assumption that we are limited creatures not just in terms time but also in terms of timelessness itself. We embrace such a

perception in the name of being humble before the majestic awesome presence of an ‘all knowing’ entity.

False modesty leads to the entrapment of the mind within the confines of prison walls impossible to break through. The only way we have of breaking through our self-created wall of confinement is to break down the wall of humility we have built around ourselves. Boethius may have built the wall of limits within which we find ourselves entrapped, but we are the ones who have passively accepted their perceived impenetrability.

To free ourselves of these prison walls, we must rely upon ourselves. The method of breaking through this wall of perception is to replace the perception itself with a new perception.

Having said this, let’s begin an examination of ‘the wall’



We perceive free will and determinism to coexist not as a mixture but as a solution in and of itself. Try as we might, oil and water do not naturally create a solution. They are incompatible and that is just the point. Free will and determinism do not create a solution and as such, we cannot comprehend an alternative potential solution unless we are willing to remove the walls of Aristotle and begin looking for a different perception regarding how to incorporate the two, free will and determinism, into a different metaphysical model than the one Boethius suggested.

Boethius asserted the two, determinism – ‘divine foreknowledge’ as he puts it, and free will exist side by side, exist as companions forever tied to the very substantive travels of all individuals be they human or other forms of existence which have the distinctive mark of free will stamped upon their brows.

The only means we have of throwing off the yoke of determinism is through a new means of perception regarding just where it is we perceive ourselves to be. Such a perception would have the effect of allowing ourselves to redefine what it is we understand ourselves to be. Such a redefinition would have the impact of allowing us to establish an understanding of just why it is we may exist as individuals and why it is we may exist as the sole remaining member of the specie, *Homo sapiens*.

It is possible to model an understanding demonstrating how pure free will can exist uncompromised by ‘divine foreknowledge’. In the process of building such an understanding, we will establish a model where free will and determinism may not only be independent of each other but may simultaneously be interdependent of each other’s existence. The final result: We will see how it is metaphysics is alive rather than being ‘dead’ as we presently ‘believe’.

Even more excitingly, we will begin to gain an insight as to how it is metaphysics retains an ever-moving horizon, which may well extend infinitely beyond our reach just as finality to the extent of knowledge itself may extend infinitely beyond our reach.

This tractate, however, is not the tractate within which this last statement will be specifically examined. The detailed examination of such a statement will have to wait for tractate 18: *The End of the Beginning*. For the time being, we must stay on track and return to our understanding regarding a new solution to the long-standing paradox regarding the simultaneous presence of free will and divine foreknowledge.

Rationalizing the irrational

‘I must be right because you don’t ‘know’ that what you are telling me is an absolute.’

What is this argument that because we have perceptual limitations, there are things we cannot ‘know’ and therefore it must be accurate to assume ‘divine foreknowledge’ exists yet ‘divine foreknowledge’ is not determinism.

Is a metaphysical system, which embraces the simultaneous existence of free will and determinism co-existing in the form of adjacent actions of multiplicity, found ‘within’ a region of multiplicity itself, a logical point of metaphysical perception? In terms of a metaphysical system of the past, yes it is. In terms of the new knowledge we have gleaned over the last millennium and a half, no it isn’t.

It is time to update our perception of rational metaphysical perceptions. In order to do so, let's examine a new metaphysical system to understand just how free will and determinism may coexist without contradicting one another as is the case with Boethius’ metaphysical system.

The limits of language

We live ‘within’ the limits of what it is we are able to communicate to each other. We live ‘within’ this thing we call language. The implication is we will never ‘know’ truth.

Regardless of whether or not one agrees with such a statement, one cannot ignore the fact that we are confined by language. Likewise it must be remembered that we are immersed ‘within’ language and thus must either find a means to break out of the limits language places upon us or we must expand language to meet our expanded perceptions.

We presently embrace concepts such as:

Free will has been predetermined yet predestined acts remain acts of free will.

Predestined free will is free will.

Free will immersed within divine foreknowledge is free will

We accept such contradictions because we 'believe'

'In the same way, human reason refuses to believe that divine intelligence can see the future in any other way except that in which human reason has knowledge.' ...

We hide behind the perception that it is 'too difficult' a paradox to understand the whole and as such we submit to arguments that we should not 'waste' our energies upon such impossible tasks as understanding the relationship between free will and determinism.

Until we refuse to end our actions of hiding behind the conceptual perception that it is too complicated to revise language so as to elevate language to the level capable of describing advanced metaphysical perceptions, we will never understand how it is:

Free will that has been predetermined is not free will.

Predestined free will is not free will.

Free will immersed within 'divine' foreknowledge might very well be free will

It is understandable why we hesitate to release the concept of determinism and begin to embrace the full ramifications of free will. Free will places a yoke of responsibility upon each and every one of us. Determinism, on the other hand:


1. Provides the rationale for our not being responsible for our actions
2. Accepts our actions as a matter of fact, actions which we cannot avoid
3. Excuses our need to take responsibility for our action

Who would be so irrational as to accept one's responsibility for one's own action when there is a way to avoid such responsibility? That may be a fair statement, but to ignore 'what is' in favor of 'what is not' does not nullify 'what is' being 'what is'.

Should we be afraid of exploring a rational understanding of the whole and our relationship to the whole? Perhaps, on the other hand, perhaps Churchill provided some insightful perspective we can apply to such a situation when he said: 'We have nothing to fear but fear itself.'

Oil and Water

Free will and determinism are like oil and water – you cannot put them together and obtain a solution. You may put them together but what you obtain is simply a mixture.



So, which is the water and which is the oil? Is free will oil or water? Is determinism oil or water? If one is oil is the other water?

When one performs the operation of mixing oil and water one obtains oil being contained within water unless one factors in the container itself. If one factors in the container itself, one may obtain a layer of oil coating the inside of the container within which water is found to contain the droplets of oil. This is not to be ignored for the analogy itself exists. For the time being however,


we have little choice but to ignore this aspect of the analogy and move on with our discussion.
The more complex analogy will be addressed later.

As such, lets examine the two possibilities:

Possibility 1:

Oil/free will


Water/determinism



Possibility 2:

Oil/determinism

Water/free will




Possibility #1 suggests free will is found immersed 'within' determinism. Possibility # 2 suggests determinism is found immersed 'within' free will. Which is the 'correct' perspective?

Let's examine the two possibilities and see where it gets us. As we do so, let's change the shape of the container for the purposes of making them more user friendly:

Possibility 1:

Oil/free will


Water/determinism



becomes:

Oil/free will


Water/determinism



Possibility 2:

Oil/free will


Water/determinism



becomes:

Oil/free will

Water/determinism



Now one will object to possibility #2 due to the general perception that oil is less dense than water. The objection evaporates, however, when one acknowledges that it is not oil and water we are examining but free will and determinism. Neither free will nor determinism can be measured in terms of density but the two are recognized as incompatible and thus the only rational we have been able to apply to our understanding regarding the existence of both existing simultaneously lies in Boethius' argument that the two can coexist if we accept:

...'Therefore, all those things which happen without happening of necessity are, before they happen, future events about to happen, but not about to happen of necessity. For just as the knowledge of present things imposes no necessity on what is happening, so foreknowledge imposes no necessity on what is going to happen.

‘The cause of this mistake is that people think that the totality of their knowledge depends on the nature and capacity to be known of the objects of knowledge. But this is all wrong.’...

‘The point of greatest importance here is this: the superior manner of knowledge includes the inferior, but it is quite impossible for the inferior to rise to the superior.’...

‘In the same way, human reason refuses to believe that divine intelligence can see the future in any other way except that in which human reason has knowledge.’...

Boethius argues we must accept what we cannot possibly understand as being what it is men say it is. Boethius argues we must accept our limits and stop trying to gain an understanding since we will never be able to understand. Boethius implies we have the ability to outline the problem but not the ability to understand the solution.

So it is we have remained mired in the lack of understanding.

Boethius states that free will finds itself subordinate to determinism, finds itself subordinate to divine foreknowledge yet remains free will and we must accept this in spite of the contradictory position such a statement forces us to assume.

In spite of the historic acceptance of such a position, the question remains: Is ‘free will’ free or is free will subordinate to determinism? The true existence of free will as opposed to the subordination of free will to determinism is what we must rationally examine and examine in detail.

The analogy of oil and water lies at the heart of the debate regarding: a) the independent – oil above water, b) the independent – an oil and water emulsion, or c) the interdependence - simultaneous existence of free will and determinism existing as a solution.

Why all the concern regarding the two simple concepts of free will and determinism? If our actions are ‘controlled’ by the forces of determinism, we, each one of us, is ‘controlled’. If our actions are ‘controlled’ by a ‘higher’ force - we are controlled. If our actions are controlled by ourselves – we are free. Gods’ puppets or ‘being free’ that is the issue.

This dialectic does not immerse itself only within past arguments, but rather this dialectic suggests a new solution to the debate. This dialectic suggests we reexamine the paradox from a new metaphysical perception. The new metaphysical perception is known:

- a. Metaphysically as the individual *acting within* God
- b. Generically as ‘symbiotic panentheism’

Let’s begin to examine a new solution to this age-old question regarding the simultaneous independent existence of free will and determinism by dividing action into four categories found ‘within’ this thing we call existence.

The four forms of action:

Four forms of action:

Passive action:

1. Action as a state of being:

The passive action of being is action in the form of the primal state of existence as opposed to other forms of action emerging from the primal state of existence

2. Actions bound by the laws of nature

Actions bound by the laws of nature are passive actions taken by inanimate objects as well as actions that simulate the action of inanimate objects – a rock falls, you fall, a rock exists, you exist

Active action:

3. Free will

Active actions of free will are actions taken by a 'knowing' object, action which could go various ways and whose action was directed by the 'knowing' object of its own accord.

4. Determinism

Active actions of free will taken by a 'knowing' object whose intended actions have been overridden by actions of free will generated by a dominating second 'knowing' object

This form of categorizing action provides the logic of accepting, as well as provides the means of understanding how determinism could exist 'within' a region of free will. This form of categorizing action provides an understanding how free will can fall under the influence of determinism through the action of determinism superceding free will. An example of just such a situation would be one forcefully holding the hand of another on a hot stove. The action of holding someone's hand in the fire supercedes the desired action of the victim to remove their hand and thus the concept of 'victim itself emerges.

Passive action:

1. The state of being: What 'is'

The state of being is a form of action requiring no 'knowing'. The state of being is:

- a. The most basic form of action.
- b. The most elementary form of all forms of action.
- c. The primal state of existence.

All other forms of action emerge from this most basic form of action.

Examples of states of being: I exist. A rock exists.

2. Actions bound by the laws of nature: What 'is being'

Actions bound by the laws of nature are action requiring no 'knowing'. Since these actions require no 'knowing' they are classified as forms of passive actions. These are actions taken by inanimate objects. Such actions also include the actions of animate entities that simulate the action of inanimate objects.

Examples of actions bound by the laws of nature: When dropped from a cliff, a rock falls. When dropped from a cliff, you fall.

Active action:

3. Actions bound by the laws of free will: What 'will be'

Actions bound by the laws of free will are 'knowing' actions taken by a 'knowing' entity and are independent of the laws of nature and independent of the laws of determinism. These actions are actions directed by the 'knowing' entity.

Examples of actions bound by the laws of free will are: I will step off the cliff.

4. Actions bound by the laws of determinism: What 'has been'

Actions bound by the laws of determinism are active 'knowing' actions taken by a 'knowing' object and are independent of the laws of nature. These actions are actions taken by a 'knowing' entity whose intended actions have been overridden by actions of free will generated by a dominating second 'knowing' entity.

Examples of actions bound by the laws of determinism are: I am, against my will, pushed off the cliff by an entity itself bound by the laws of free will.

Having classified action in this manner, it is now possible to find a unique location for these four forms of action. The process of ‘finding’ a unique location for the four forms of action provides us the means of examining the unique function of each action to the whole.

The unique location of:

1. What ‘will be’: A location for the individual – individuality
2. What ‘is being’: A location for being – action, process/reality – the universe
3. What ‘has been’: A location for God – the whole
4. What ‘is’: A location for being – existence of existence

The order listed is different from the order originally listed. There is a reason for this. The order was intentionally reordered to emphasize the concept:


The individual value related to the four action forms has no relative greater significance or lesser significance to the metaphysical system within which they are found. The metaphysical system within which the four actions forms are found could not be ‘the’ unique metaphysical system it is if any of the four forms of action were to be eliminated. The value of each form of action is not a value of relativity but rather the value of each of the four action forms have not only equal value for its own self but have equal value for each of the remaining three.

It must be emphasized repeatedly that the order is unimportant due to the lack of relative value existing within the system itself. What is important is the existence the four action forms. Without the existence of any of the four action forms, the system of the individual *acting within* God becomes something it is not, which is a static system.

What ‘will be’: Free will - A location for the individual – individuality

A location for Free Will: The existence of ‘the potential to be’

A location of: What ‘will be’



The ‘location’ of free will is a location where ‘knowing’ develops. The location of free will is itself a process. The location of free will, the ‘location’ of the process of what will be, provides the ‘location’ for the development of ‘becoming’. As such, under free will, ‘becoming’ develops

itself as a unique point of knowledge. It may even be possible that this 'location', the 'location' for the action of pure free will, itself grows as the entities of knowing gain a more in depth understanding of the 'location' itself. In essence, the very growth of knowledge, the very growth of the 'location' where 'becoming' becomes, may influence further development of that very location.

Such a statement strongly implies: Complex abstractual perceptions developed through 'knowing' evolving 'within' a location where free will exists, may lend themselves to shifts of the location itself which in turn could conceivable alter the very perceptual potential of its very 'occupants'. This could lead to an infinite number of qualitative and quantitative variations of evolution of the location of free will, thus expanding the 'location of free will's' very ability to influence the development of new units of knowing.

As complex as this may all appear, the simple point remains: It becomes obvious why 'location' becomes a necessary component of a metaphysical system such as 'symbiotic panentheism.' The whole has the characteristic of not only being but the whole is dependent upon the existence of free will to 'produce', evolve, establish unique units of knowing which expand the very knowing of the whole.

The reason determinism, as an aspect of the whole, is found 'outside' free will is because the knowledge, which has been established, the knowledge, which 'is', is. Each unit of knowing is a part of the whole. Each unit of 'knowing' can be 'examined' as infinite variations of partial units of itself, yet each unit of knowing can be 'examined' as a whole unit in and of itself found within the greater Whole.

Since there is a seemingly endless, infinite number of units of 'knowing', units of knowledge, units of perceptions gained through the process of acquiring knowledge while evolving within a location for free will, there emerges a sense of omniscience of the whole. In fact, there would be what one would call omniscience of the whole.

The question then becomes: Does free will exist as a part of the whole? Within a metaphysical system of the individual *acting within* God, free will does exist as a part of the whole for there is a location of free will located 'within', and therefore is a part of, the whole.

The question then becomes refined: Does free will exist as a part of the whole void the 'locations' of free will? In essence the question becomes: Does the whole as itself have free will?

Well now, this is a question, which goes to the understanding of the whole as the whole as opposed to the interrelationship of individual units of knowing and the whole. This is a question philosophy has never asked before because philosophy did not understand the concept of the whole having its own knowing separate from its knowing as the sum of individual packets of knowing which was thought to equal the whole. It was never considered how it was possible for the whole to be greater than the sum of its parts.

So again: Does the whole have free will other than that found within the physical universe within which knowing itself grows?

The question leads us back to the concept: Which came first, the chicken or the egg?

In terms of the whole: Could the whole have developed free will as a mechanism of growth or did the whole exist initially as the whole whose primal characteristics included the innate characteristic of free will? Alternatively, did the whole become the whole because it in fact used its preexisting free will to develop itself in the manner with which it does so?

This is not a typical question asked of metaphysics. Rather the question is a more theoretical problem requiring a theoretical solution. In essence, metaphysics, with the aid of these tractates, is becoming specialized into a field of theoretical metaphysics as opposed to the more practical metaphysics we find within our perception regarding reality of the physical universe, as we perceive it today. Again, another field of metaphysics arises, practical metaphysics. Once we

begin to ask the more theoretical question we find ourselves being able to do so only ‘after’ we have accepted the more basic premises of metaphysics. The very acceptance of basic metaphysics premises produces what we call Practical Metaphysics. And with the establishment of practical metaphysics comes a natural out cropping, Metaphysical Engineering, the process of shaping society based upon what our most acceptable metaphysical system implies. The emergence of Metaphysical Engineering suggests Plato may have been more correct than he ever dreamed when he stated: It is the philosopher who should head government.

What is: Divine foreknowledge - A location for God – the whole

A location for divine foreknowledge: the existence of ‘what is’

A location of: What ‘has been’

Near the beginning of the book: Boethius: *The Consolation of Philosophy*, Penguin Classics, 1969, one finds the statement:

‘It is not allowed to man to comprehend in thought all the ways of the divine work.’ (Boethius: *The Consolation of Philosophy*, IV, 6)

Boethius then ends his work with the statement:

‘What does it matter, then, if they are not necessary, when because of the condition of divine foreknowledge it will turn out exactly as if they were necessary? The answer is this. It is impossible for the two events I mentioned just now – the rising of the sun and the man walking – not to be happening when they do happen: and yet it was necessary for one of them to happen before it did happen, but not so for the other. And so, those things, which are present to God, will without doubt happen: but some of them result from the necessity of things,

and some of them from the power of those who do them. We are not wrong, therefore, to say that if these things are considered with reference to divine foreknowledge, they are necessary, but if they are considered by themselves, they are free of the bonds of necessity: just as everything that the senses perceive is universal if considered with reference to the reason, but individual if considered in itself.

‘But, you will reply, if it lies in my power to change a proposed course of action, I will be able to evade Providence, for I will perhaps have altered things which providence foreknows. My answer will be that you can alter your plan, but that since this is possible, and since whether you do so or in what way you change it is visible to Providence the ever present and true, you cannot escape divine foreknowledge, just as you cannot escape the sight of an eye that is present to watch, though of your own free will you may turn to a variety of actions.

‘Well, you may ask, isn’t divine knowledge changed as a result of my rearrangement, so that as I change my wishes it, too, seems to change its knowledge? The answer is no. Each future thing is anticipated by the gaze of God which bends it back and recalls it to the presence of its own manner of knowledge: it does not change... but with one glance anticipates and embraces your changes in its constancy... So that the difficulty you put forward a short time ago, that it was unfitting if our future is said to provide a cause of God’s knowledge, is solved. The power of this knowledge, which embraces all things in present understanding, has itself set a limit upon things and owes nothing to events, which come after. And since this is so, man’s freedom of will remains inviolate and the law does not impose reward and punishment unfairly, because the will is free from all necessity. God has foreknowledge and rests a spectator from on high of all things: and as the ever present eternity of His vision dispenses reward to the good and punishment to the bad, it adapts itself to the future quality


of our actions. Hope is not placed in God in vain and prayers are not made in vain, for if they are the right kind they cannot but be efficacious. Avoid vice, therefore, and cultivate virtue: lift up your mind to the right kind of hope and put forth humble prayers on high. A great necessity is laid upon you, if you will be honest with yourself, a great necessity to be good, since you live in the sight of a judge who sees all things.’⁶

In essence, Boethius stipulates the book is already written. ‘To which book are we referring?’ one may ask. We are referring to the book, which has more significance to ourselves than any other book. We are referring to the book, which outlines life itself. We are referring to what one might call the ‘Divine Book’.


The Divine Book includes the chapters: Divine Foreknowledge, Pre-destination, Predestination, and Determinism.

The book to which Boethius refers is not an ongoing book but rather a closed book, a completed book. The closed book – the fallacy of the argument regarding a ‘closed’ book and God opening the book does not mean the ending is not ‘known’ just because the players themselves do not know the ending until they get to the end.

We speak of ‘a’ book because Divine Foreknowledge suggests all is ‘known’. As such, the ‘book’ has been written. So where is it one finds the ‘divine book’? One finds the divine book located in a region of established abstraction void actions bound by the laws of nature:



Perhaps one could say: The book is not ‘a’ book but rather ‘a’ set of books. Such a perceptions could be represented as follows:




This representation demonstrates the concept Boethius suggested regarding Divine Foreknowledge. So, what is the difference between the first and second diagram? The difference lies in the different perception, which emerges from each perception.


The first diagram suggests the existence of ‘a’ book and thus suggests ‘all is known’ to the whole.

The second diagram suggests a series of books, which in turn suggests a production of books. The second diagram suggests there is a ‘source’ of these books. As such, the question arises: Is there a ‘location’ from which the books evolve?


The first diagram suggests the existence of ‘a’ book:




Upon further examination, ‘The Divine Book’ becomes:




And then, since 'the' Divine Book contains 'all knowing' we in essence have:




The second diagram suggests a series of books:



One could depict the concept of an ‘emerging/evolving’ ‘knowing, depict the concept of ‘emerging/evolving’ books as”



Now isolating the ‘evolving’ Divine Book in order to facilitate it’s evolving uninfluenced by what is, we obtain:



We are back to the concept of abstraction existing ‘outside’ the physical. Once again, we are back to the solution we examined in Tractate 1: Zeno and Seamlessness. Again, we find ourselves confronted with the concept of the ‘real’ and the ‘real illusion’ coexisting as was discussed in Tractate 1. The diagram clearly demonstrates the relevancy of the solution we examined within Tractate 2: Aristotle and Cartesian Systems, the concept of ‘relative first truth’ as opposed to Aristotle’s implied existence of ‘a’ ‘first truth’.

Determinism is determinism, predestination is predestination, the book is the book, and divine foreknowledge is foreknowledge be it divine or otherwise.

Philosophically, it has often been said that life is but a book already written within which living entities of reality can no more see what is to come than can the characters in a book.

If one should open the book at page 15 today or tomorrow, the results are the same. The characters on page 15 have no idea regarding what will happen on page 456 regardless of how many times the book has been read from cover to cover by the ‘whole’, by totality, by ‘God’. Regardless of how many times ‘God’ rereads ‘the book’; the ‘story’ remains the same for Divine foreknowledge, as espoused by Boethius, remains Divine foreknowledge. Within ‘Boethius’ metaphysical system, regardless of the fact that the ‘whole’ may be found existing hunched over the book and rereading it for the hundred millionth times, the ending remains the same.

Some would say language is too limited to allow us the ability to understand what it is we cannot possibly perceive. Again how ludicrous, if we can perceive the overall concept then the overall concept is not outside our ability to perceive the concept itself. ‘A’ concept may take some time to develop language capable of expressing the concept we perceive. It may take time to develop our understanding in order to express the concept we think we understand. It may take time to expand upon our perceptions in order to express what it is we sense our perceptions to be but which we have difficulty fully understanding. Regardless, if we do not ‘presently’ find it within

ourselves to express what it is we 'perceive', eventually we will be able to express what it is we could not temporally express.

What does this have to do with Boethius? If we insist upon embracing the concept that there are things we conceptualize but will never be able to understand, then we shall remain ignorant of understanding not because we can 'never' understand but because we choose not to understand.

The only way to begin to understand the concept of 'determinism' and 'free will' existing simultaneously is through the process of remaining open and rejecting suggestions that we accept our lack of understanding as being simply a limitedness of our abilities. In short we cannot resolve the paradox of free will and determinism existing simultaneously until we dismiss Boethius' resolution to the issue as being simply something we have to accept, as being beyond our intellectual abilities.

Zeno, with the introduction of the paradoxes of time and space, reached the philosophical level of understanding what it is we sense but could not express in the time period of 500 BC. For two and a half millennium, we have been 'stuck' at this level. We have embraced Boethius' resolution to the problem, the concept of our limitedness, because we have been unable to express a solution to the problem. We are now at a point where we can begin to understand seamlessness existing simultaneously with multiplicity. We are now at a point where we can begin to understand how it is the physical world, multiplicity, can exist simultaneously with the abstract, seamlessness. Such understandings now begin to emerge through understanding the concept of seamlessness existing independent of multiplicity, through understanding that seamlessness, abstraction, exists independently of multiplicity, the physical, through understanding one existing 'inside' the other, through understanding a greater Reality existing 'outside' physical reality, through understanding the physical, multiplicity, existing immersed 'within' timeless existence itself.

What ‘is being’: **Determinism - A location for being – action, process/reality – the universe**


A location for Free Will to act: The process: individuality, the individual, becoming

A location of: What ‘is being’


We have briefly examined the need as well as the rationality regarding ‘a’ location for both free will and divine foreknowledge

What then of determinism: Isn’t determinism the same thing as divine foreknowledge? We often consider the two to be the same concept. Therein lies one of our problems regarding the paradoxical perception that free will and divine foreknowledge exist simultaneously as ‘the’ dominant form of action located ‘within’ the ‘same’ location.

By classifying action into four classes, we find a separate location for determinism. Presently we have proposed:



So where does this leave us regarding ‘a’ location for determinism? We have ‘a’ location for which one of the four forms of action has not been attributed:



Now we begin to understand what is meant by the concept: Determinism

Passive action:

2. Actions bound by the laws of nature: What ‘is being’

Actions bound by the laws of nature are actions requiring no ‘knowing’. Since these actions require no ‘knowing’ they are classified as forms of passive actions. These are actions taken by inanimate objects. Such actions also include the actions of animate entities that simulate the action of inanimate objects.

Examples of actions bound by the laws of nature: When dropped from a cliff, a rock falls. When dropped from a cliff, you fall.

What ‘is’: Pre-destination/predestination - A location for being – existence of existence

A location for determinism to act, a location for free will to act, the process of the whole becoming, a location of what ‘is’

What is ‘intended’: Determinism and free will simultaneously independent

What then are we to say regarding our fourth form of action: Actions bound by the laws of: The state of being: What ‘is’?

This is perhaps the most interesting of the four forms of action for it is this very action, which makes the concept of separation of free will from divine foreknowledge possible.

Passive action:


1. The state of being: What ‘is’

The state of being is a form of action requiring no ‘knowing’. The state of being is the most basic form of action. This form of passive action, the state of the individual itself is the most elementary form of passive action. The primal state of existence is the most basic form of action. All other forms of action emerge from this most basic form of action.


Examples of states of being: I exist. A rock exists.

Where are we to find such action? It would appear there is 'nowhere' to place such action other than 'outside' the system thus once again rendering the system an incomplete system.


To understand the fourth location it will help to first simplify the concept. We do so by examining a simple circle:




At first glance, it would appear the circle divides space into two regions:



Upon closer examination, we find this to be an incomplete perception. In actuality, the circle divides space into three regions:



With this in mind, we can reexamine our previous diagram and as we do so it becomes apparent that there is not only 'a' location for our fourth form of action but in fact there are three locations for our fourth form of action:



Functionality of action


Now we have a problem. We come back to our previous statement: ‘Having classified action (classified action into distinct groups) in this manner, it is now possible to find a location for these four forms of action.

To refresh our memory regarding these groups we see we have two major groups each of which are further divided into two subgroups:

- I. Passive action
 - a. States of being
 - b. Actions bound by the laws of nature
- II. Active action
 - a. Actions bound by the laws of free will
 - b. Actions bound by the laws of determinism

At first glance it would appear there are three forms of active action and one state of pacifisity. How is it ‘action’ bound by the laws of nature are passive when they involve motion. Metaphysically all forms of action, regardless of whether or not they are ‘in’ motion or simply existing, without ‘knowing’ are passive forms of action.

This then brings us back to our previous examination regarding the ‘levels’ at which actions are placed:



Part II of this tractate found a new level of action being introduced into the model. As such the dynamics of the graphic has been expanded to include four action forms versus three action forms found in Part I of this tractate


Two questions emerge from the information we have:

1. How is it possible one form of action is, can be, appears to be, more significant than another if all forms of action exist?
2. How can there be four simultaneous independent ‘locations’ for action when we ‘know’ of only two possible forms of action: the active and the passive forms of action.

Regarding question #1:

There is no rational answer to the question. The only way to answer the question is to simplify our diagram. Rather than 'level's of one dimension we will mold action into a two dimensional state:


We will begin the process through the application of Ockham's razor by removing the perceived relative values of significance we previously illustrated:




Applying Ockham's razor once again, we obtain:




If we then establish boundaries of existence for actions bound by the laws of nature, we obtain:



If we continue to expand upon the boundaries enclosing actions bound by the laws of nature we obtain:



If we then establish boundaries of existence for actions bound by the laws of determinism, we obtain:



Now why expand the boundaries regarding actions bound by the laws of determinism beyond the boundaries of actions bound by the laws of nature? We do so first to respect Boethius' concept of divine foreknowledge being 'within'. The concept of actions being 'found' 'within' totality applies to all forms of action. We do so secondly because, as we shall see, it provides the means of resolving not only Boethius' paradox of free will versus determinism but it also resolves Zeno's paradox of seamlessness versus multiplicity. In addition, the action of expanding the boundary of actions bound by the laws of determinism in such a manner as to encompass actions bound by the laws of free will allows for the resolution of Aristotle's paradox. As we shall see in another tractate, this very perceptual process allows for the resolution regarding the paradox of a Kantian Cartesian system versus a Hegelian non-Cartesian system. In fact, such a perceptual

model, provides a means by which we can resolve a myriad other metaphysical, ontological, and cosmological paradoxes as well.

But back to the task we have been addressing, understanding 'location' of action. The question then becomes: What then of:




Why it becomes:



Or:




Whose 'location of existence becomes quite obvious when we remove the clutter and label the 'locations' of action:



This does not appear to answer question #2: How can there be four simultaneous independent 'locations' for action when we 'know' of only two possibilities? We understand the concept of the entity and the concept of the universe, our reality.


Perhaps this can more simply be explained through the examination of a circle:




There appears to be two locations in this diagram:

1. The inside of the circle
2. The outside of the circle


In actuality, however, there are three locations to this diagram:




With this in mind, we can then identify the four locations of our previous diagram:



But how can a 'location' implement 'action'? It cannot. What implements action are entities themselves. How then do we reconcile such a statement with the diagram above? We cannot if we retain Zeno's perception as discussed in Tractate 1: Zeno and Seamlessness:




Nor can we reconcile such a statement if we retain Aristotle's perception as discussed in Tractate 2: Aristotle and Cartesian Systems:



However, we can reconcile the questions:

1. 'But how can a 'location' implement 'action'?'
2. How can there be four simultaneous independent 'locations' for action when we 'know' of only two possibilities?


if we go back to the previous diagram:



The entity 'within' the circle, within the physical obviously exists, obviously exists within a region of action bound by the laws of nature, intuitively exists within the region of action bound by the laws of free will – actions that do not defy the laws of nature.

Where, however, is the entity implementing action bound by the laws of determinism?

The solution becomes apparent when the entity whose actions are bound by the laws of free will as well as whose actions are bound by the laws of nature are terminated by the laws of nature themselves and thus moves into the non-physical, pure abstractual location of existence. As such, the diagram becomes:



Why do the discussion of time and distance suddenly enter the discussion. Time and distance enter the discussion because we understand time and distance to be functions of the physical, functions of space, matter, and energy themselves. As such, the introduction of these concepts at this point in the discussion helps us to visualize, in a less theoretical manner, the metaphysical system suggested. This helps to initiate discussions immersed in pragmatism.

Locations for actions

Four questions arise with the establishment of forms of action:

There are four forms of action:

- a. The state of being: a form of passive action
- b. Actions bound by the laws of nature: a form of passive action
- c. Actions bound by the laws of free will: a form of active action
- d. Actions bound by the laws of determinism: a form of active action

The question: Why?

Why the need for a location of action bound by the laws of being?

Why the need for a location of action bound by the laws of nature?

Why the need for a location of action bound by the laws of free will?

Why the need for a location of action bound by the laws of determinism?


The short answers:

What is

What must be

What could be

What is is



In order to expand our understanding regarding all this back and forth in terms of perceptual understanding, perhaps it would be beneficial to examine the concepts of divine foreknowledge, pre-destination, predestination, and determinism in a little more detail.


Divine foreknowledge, pre-destination, predestination, and determinism versus free will

Having touched upon the concepts free will, divine foreknowledge, pre-destination, and predestination it may help, before we move on with attempting to further resolve Boethius' paradox, to examine the four more closely as regards present day perceptions versus a new perception.

Divine foreknowledge:

The concept of divine foreknowledge suggests an awareness of all there was and all there is. The question arises does divine foreknowledge imply an awareness of all that will be. The very name ‘foreknowledge’ suggests that to be the case but is it necessarily the case?

Present day perceptions:



Within such a system, there is only one possible conclusion to the question: Does divine ‘foreknowledge’ imply not only an awareness of what was and what is but an awareness of what will be?

Since the location of all knowledge is ‘contained’ ‘within #3, entrance of ‘new’ knowing unknown to an omniscient location would suggest the omniscient location is in fact a location without omniscience. The conclusion: Location #3, being omniscient, has no option but to have knowledge of what will be.

This perception is rational yet unexplainable when examined in the face of free will being free will. Thus Boethius’ statement:

...’Therefore, all those things which happen without happening of necessity are, before they happen, future events about to happen, but not about to happen of necessity. For just as the knowledge of present things imposes no necessity on what is happening, so foreknowledge imposes no necessity on what is going to happen.

‘The cause of this mistake is that people think that the totality of their knowledge depends on the nature and capacity to be known of the objects of knowledge. But this is all wrong.’...

‘The point of greatest importance here is this: the superior manner of knowledge includes the inferior, but it is quite impossible for the inferior to rise to the superior.’...

‘In the same way, human reason refuses to believe that divine intelligence can see the future in any other way except that in which human reason has knowledge.’...

becomes the rationale as to why this is so. Our lack of understanding is due to our limited perception relative to the Whole itself. We perceive the Whole as being what is found ‘within’ physical reality, within our universe.


Can such an argument be circumvented? A modification of our present perception through the simple process of shifting the location of the physical reality from being placed within a void into being placed within a region of abstraction will resolve the issue. The perceptual development of an abstractual region not only eliminates the questionable region of a void, region #2, existing ‘outside’ of regions #1 and #3 and thus simplifies the perception but the process of shifting the physical into existing ‘within’ the abstractual simplifies the repercussions regarding the concept of ‘death’ itself. Interestingly enough, the concept of ‘death’ does not just

apply to unique entities of ‘knowing’ found ‘within’ the universe but applies to the unique entities of ‘knowing’ found ‘within’ the abstract should the universe itself ‘die’.

But why wouldn’t the abstract shift into the physical as opposed to the physical shifting into the abstract? This discussion took place within Tractate 1: Zeno and Seamlessness.

Let’s look in more detail at what we are suggesting.

The new perception:




Within such a system, there is a new possibility regarding the question: Does divine ‘foreknowledge’ imply not only an awareness of what was and what is but also imply an awareness of what will be?

Within such a system, since the location of all knowledge is ‘contained’ ‘within’ #3, entrance of ‘new’ unknown knowing into an omniscient location would not require entrance for it would already be ‘within’. As such, the concept of what will be would be a part of what is and thus becomes a form of what is versus what will be.

However, wouldn’t the entrance of unique entities of ‘knowing’ into #3 imply either a level of cardinality, an order of consecutiveness, or both? If we reexamine the diagram using a little more

detail, we begin to find answers to just such questions regarding levels of cardinality and orders of consecutiveness.



Such a perception does more than provide a symmetrical orientation to the perception we have of what we call our universe, what we call reality.

Such a perception explains how it is possible to gain an entrance of 'newness', an entrance of what 'will be' into what 'is' without our present understanding of 'newness' following 'oldness', without the need of our present understanding of consecutive order and our present understanding of 'levels' of cardinality in terms of individual significance.

When 'newness', what 'will be', enters region #3, 'newness' carries with it an understanding of time and distance but enters a region lacking time and distance. As such, independent packets of knowing have no relative primal order upon which they depend once within region #3.

The same concept applies to relative concepts of 'worth'. This concept will be examined in detail within Tractate 4: Copernicus. In the mean time, let us return to the concept of 'free will' becoming simply a state of what 'is' within such system and thus the concept of what 'will be' no longer becomes an issue for region #3. The result: The concept, divine foreknowledge, becomes a possibility for region #3 while simultaneously being a non-issue for region #1.

This process is best described as a process of separation through inclusion as opposed to separation through exclusion. This concept is described in detail in Tractate 8: Russell. Although the process of separation through inclusion best describes the system, Tractate 4: Copernicus lays the foundation to understanding such a concept through its dialectic regarding centricism versus non-centricism.

The new perception initiates an understanding regarding how it is 'free will' could exist simultaneously with 'divine foreknowledge'. This in turn allows us to discard Boethius' premise that humanity is capable of perceiving paradoxes including some of which humanity is incapable of resolving.

Thus, Boethius' statement:

...'Therefore, all those things which happen without happening of necessity are, before they happen, future events about to happen, but not about to happen of necessity. For just as the knowledge of present things imposes no necessity on what is happening, so foreknowledge imposes no necessity on what is going to happen.

'The cause of this mistake is that people think that the totality of their knowledge depends on the nature and capacity to be known of the objects of knowledge. But this is all wrong.'...

‘The point of greatest importance here is this: the superior manner of knowledge includes the inferior, but it is quite impossible for the inferior to rise to the superior.’...

‘In the same way, human reason refuses to believe that divine intelligence can see the future in any other way except that in which human reason has knowledge.’...


is on the brink of finally being able to be discarded, at least for the time being. Interestingly enough, while we may be able to discard Boethius’ concept regarding the limitedness of entities of ‘knowing’ we are able to retain Boethius’ concepts regarding the simultaneous existence of ‘free will’ and ‘divine foreknowledge’.

So much for ‘divine foreknowledge’, but what of pre-destination?

Pre-destination:

Pre-destination is the concept of individual entities of ‘knowing’ having a variety of locations to which the individual entities of ‘knowing’ can ‘go’. In the case of pre-destination it would better be said: Pre-destination is the concept of individual entities of ‘knowing’ having pre-assigned locations to which they are sent irrespective of the desire of the individual entity of ‘knowing’, irrespective of the desire of any parts of the whole, and irrespective of the desire of the whole itself. Pre-destination applies to the situation where the entities of ‘knowing’ becoming separated from the physical should such a separation be possible.

Present day perceptions:




Within such a system, there are three possibilities: We are 'pre-destined' to enter one of three locations:

1. Upon death we may enter the universe. However since the universe is immersed 'within' time, since time is an apparent innate characteristic of a matter/energy system, then when time ends abstractual knowing has two possibilities
2. Upon death of the universe or before the death of the universe, abstractual knowing will enter either #2 or #3. If abstractual knowing enters #2 then abstractual knowing is alone, perhaps forever, fear enters the picture.
3. Upon death of the universe or before death of the universe, abstractual knowing will enter either #2 or #3. If abstractual knowing enters #3 then abstractual knowing no longer remains isolated, fear exits the picture

The criteria for entering #3: 'behavior' as pre-defined by 'men' or 'God'.

The new perception:



Two possibilities: We are 'pre-destined' to enter one of two 'locations'

1. Upon death, we may enter the universe. However since the universe is immersed 'within' time, since time is an apparent innate characteristic of a matter/energy system, then when time ends abstractual knowing has one possibility:
2. Upon death of the universe or before death of the universe, abstractual knowing will enter #3. If abstractual knowing enters #3 then abstractual knowing remains but no longer remains isolated, fear exists the picture

The criteria for entering #3: There is no criterion for entering #3, for there is no other possibility.

The implication is that pre-destination no longer becomes a pre-destined destination but rather the location is singular. Only one location exists although that location may be subdivided into various distinct perceptual subsets. The result of a perception of singularity: the elimination of the need to 'enter'. One is already 'in' the location of one's desired final destination.

If pre-destination no longer becomes pre-destined in the sense that a choice of one of several destinations is 'made' or is 'assigned for one's self by a second party other than one's self, what then of predestination?

The concept of pre-destination becoming obsolete is not the only resultant obsolescence the new perception, singularity of location, creates.

Predestination:

Present day perceptions:

Predestination: The doctrine that man's salvation or damnation was predetermined from eternity by God. When the doctrine holds that not only man's eventual disposition but every event of his life is predestined, the position is identical to a special kind of determinism.⁷

Under an Aristotelian system, predestination suggests the 'divine book' has already been written. Predestination suggests, although one may not 'know' of one's future, the reader, the author, or both can certainly look ahead and discover what is to happen to the participants, the characters, 'within' the book. This concept, however, eludes the characters found within the 'divine book'.

The 'degree of action', possessed by the characters found within 'the divine book', separates predestination from various types and degrees of determinism.

Regardless of the degree of separation, however, all forms of predestination and determinism embrace the concept of 'a' 'divine book'. One form of 'divine book' may be more interactive than another but they all have 'an' ending.


The new perception:

Within a perceptual system of singularity subdivided into subsets, time and distance are not what complete individual entities of 'knowing', entities of individuality; find themselves immersed 'within'. Rather completed entities of 'knowing find time and distance immersed 'within' themselves. Time and distance find themselves immersed 'within' completed units of 'knowing'.

On the other hand, it is the ‘forming’, the ‘evolving’, ‘incomplete’ units of ‘knowing’ which find themselves immersed ‘within’ time and distance.

The perception of the whole system creates a new understanding as to the ‘meaning’ of predestination.

Before examining the new perception regarding predestination, let’s reexamine the new perception regarding singularity of location. We will begin such an examination with a familiar diagram. The diagram is slightly different, however, from what we examined previously. In this diagram, the specific regions within which time and space can be found are identified. When examining such regions, do not overlook the significance regarding the difference between physically experiencing time and space versus abstractually perceiving time and space.



So what does this do to the concept of 'predestination'?

This perception moves predestination from being:

*Predestination: The doctrine that man's salvation or damnation was predetermined from eternity by God. When the doctrine holds that not only man's eventual disposition but every event of his life is predestined, the position is identical to a special kind of determinism.*⁸

To being:

Predestination would now suggest the 'divine book' has not 'been' written but 'is being' written. Predestination suggests, although one may not 'know' of one's future, neither does the reader, neither does the author know of one's future for the future has not yet been written for the 'book' is written but on the other hand the 'book' is ever evolving within a 'location' of timelessness.

Predestination would now suggest absolutely NO entity can look ahead and discover what 'is to happen' to the participants, the characters 'within' the book. The concept of 'knowing' how the story ends eludes all entities of the system including the entity of the 'whole' system itself.

How can this be? The inability to understand the 'end' of the story becomes a characteristic of the system for the concept of time is not 'a' universal factor of the whole but rather time simply finds itself as 'an' aspect of subsets of the whole rather than being 'a' universal characteristic of the whole.

As such, the 'divine book' appropriately becomes the epitome of the lesser-known children's novel: 'The Never Ending Story'. And just why would such a perception be 'appropriate'? It becomes appropriate for it moves us into understanding that we are not a subset of a 'static' 'whole' but rather we are a subset of a 'dynamic' whole and as such we do not have just a journey of exciting discover awaiting us but rather we have an 'endless' exciting journey of discover. Within such a perception, we will never run out of 'new' exciting experiences and

fascinating previously unknown knowledge for ‘newness’ itself becomes an innate characteristic of the ‘whole’. Such a perception represents the fountain of youth for our specie, for how can one ever grow old when presented with an endless emergence of new frontiers to placate our unquenchable thirst for new knowledge.

This new perception suggests the only form of ‘predestination’ lies in the concept of change itself. This new perception suggests we, as individuals and as a specie, are a part of this thing called ‘eternal change’ in a much greater degree than we have every previously conceived.

Within the new perception, although predestination and determinism embrace the concept of ‘a’ ‘divine book’, they embrace it as a ‘Never Ending Story’ for the ‘divine book’ no longer has ‘an’ ending.

How does this new perception affect the concept of determinism? Does determinism remain simply an extreme form of predestination, as we presently perceive it to be?

Determinism:


Present day perception:

When the doctrine holds that not only man’s eventual disposition but every event of his life is predestined, the position is identical to a special kind of determinism⁹

Within an Aristotelian system, the statement is absolute not only in terms of what it implies but in terms of what it so succinctly states. As such, no more need be said regarding present day perceptions of determinism.

The new perception:

To best understand the concept of determinism as it applies to a perception of singular location composed of subsets, a diagram once again will be the best manner to initiate the discussion. This diagram may look familiar, as it well should by now, but the dialogue boxes are now filled with the four forms of action:



Now what is the difference between regions #1 and #2 in terms of determinism?

Region #2:

Within this region, within the region of the physical universe, actions bound by the laws of nature, actions which are subject to the laws of nature, actions observed and measured through the fields of science: physics, genetics, chemistry, etc.

Within this region, free will may operate but it does not operate unaffected by the laws of nature.

Region #1;

Within this region, within the region of pure abstraction, actions bound by the laws of nature are not found. As such, entities found 'within' this region have a much greater degree of potential acts they can 'perform' but the trade off is: They are unable to 'experience' 'originally'. Even though 'free will exists within this region, no unique, no original 'change' takes place because 'unique change' is a function of time and time is a function of the sub-entities rather than being a function of the whole.

In this section of the tractate, we have been giving a cursory examination to the concepts of divine foreknowledge, pre-destination, predestination, and determinism. One should note, that the concept of 'free will' has now been added to the equation. What of 'free will', does it change in terms of a 'new perception' as opposed to 'present day perception'? Absolutely, a perceptual change in our understanding of free will is where the heart and soul of this tractate lies. The understanding of a concept such as free will cannot be expressed in 'a' paragraph but rather takes a complete tractate to accomplish. The totality of this tractate is where a new understanding of free will lies.

With this in mind, we need to examine the concept of free will in detail. Before we do, however, let's examine the concept of determinism in a little more detail.

Internationality: the need ‘for’ a location of determinism

Actions bound by the laws of determinism: What ‘has been’

Actions bound by the laws of determinism are active ‘knowing’ actions taken by a ‘knowing’ entity and are independent of the laws of nature. Actions of determinism are actions generated by a ‘knowing’ entity whose intended actions are to over-ride actions of free will generated by a second ‘knowing’ entity. Examples of actions bound by the laws of determinism are: I am, against my will, pushed off the cliff by an entity itself bound by the laws of free will.

Actions bound by the laws of determinism tend to establish ‘gods’ and ‘God’. What is the difference between ‘gods’ and ‘God’? ‘gods’ are ‘beings’, physical essences, ‘higher order’ ‘beings’ while God is an abstractual essence, ‘higher order’ God.

‘Beings’ versus God, what is the difference? In the sense of the four actions identified by metaphysics, nothing.

However, isn’t there a difference of degree? Actually, there is no difference of degree. The action of overriding the free will of an entity is the action of overriding the free will of an entity. Isn’t there a form of overriding the free will of an entity, which the entity in turn can overcome? If the entity whose freewill is being overridden manages to overcome the action of ‘gods’ or God and thus maintains its actions bound by the laws of free will, manages to maintain its desired course as originally intended, then its free will has not been overridden. As such, free will becomes the dominant action and determinism, although it remains an issue, becomes the recessive action.

Wouldn’t an entity whose free will has been impacted by a ‘god’ or ‘God’ in an attempt to override the entity’s free will, find its intended actions altered by those very attempts to override its initial actions in the first place? Certainly. Wouldn’t such alterations be a form of ‘overriding’

the purity of action attempted by the entity attempting to initiate actions bound by the laws of free will? Absolutely. The degree of purity initiated by entities attempting to maintain their free will as well as the purity of actions initiated by entities of free will is not the issue here. Such concepts are discussions regarding what we call principles and issues regarding ‘standing up for one’s principles’.


With this having been said, we can now examine what actions bound by the laws of determinism really are. Such an examination brings us back to the four forms of action:

1. The state of being
2. Actions bound by the laws of nature
3. Actions bound by the laws of free will
4. Actions bound by the laws of determinism

Do not lose sight of the fact that within this tractate, the order given for the four forms of action in no way implies relative significance of one form of action over another. It may be too difficult to subconsciously overlook such a natural tendency without a little help. To assist us in recognizing the equality regarding all forms of action, let's restate the four forms of action and then proceed:

1. Actions bound by the laws of determinism
2. Actions bound by the laws of nature
3. The state of being
4. Actions bound by the laws of free will

Through the aid of the concept of 'location', we can begin to examine the four forms of action:



With this diagram in mind, lets re-categorize our four forms of action:

Forms of determinism:

1. Actions bound by the laws of nature
2. Actions bound by the laws of determinism
3. States of being

Forms of free will:

4. Actions bound by the laws of free will


We have little difficulty acknowledging 'the state of being' exists.

We have little difficulty acknowledging, 'actions bound by the laws of nature' exist.

We have little difficulty acknowledging, 'actions bound by the laws of determinism' exist.

We do, however, have a problem understanding forms of free will. For the time being, we are going to set free will aside and focus upon the other three forms of action.

As such our previous diagram now becomes:



Earthquakes, volcanoes, waves, wind, starlight, gravitational pull, etc. are all forms actions bound by the laws of nature. These actions are, in present day society, perceived as neutral actions but actions nevertheless. They are perceived as actions, which affect entities of 'knowing'. For the most part, however, they are actions whose pre-existing laws we, entities of knowing, find affecting ourselves in a neutral manner. These forms of actions originate in response to the 'laws' of nature and are not 'initiated' in a conscious manner planned by the natural entity of the mountain, the star, the ocean, the atmosphere.

I am, you are, the mountain is, the lake is, the house is, the tree is, etc, are all forms of actions represented by the passive action: the state of being. These actions are in present day society, perceived as neutral actions but actions nevertheless. They are perceived as actions, which effect entities of 'knowing', but for the most part, are actions whose pre-existing laws we exist 'within' rather than being actions unit entities intentionally, 'knowingly', willingly, and consciously initiate in a physical sense.

Murder, rape, verbal-abuse, genocide, physical assault, etc are, from the perspective of the victim, all forms of actions bound by the laws of determinism since the actions are not 'controlled' by the victim. These action, are in present day society, perceived as aggressive actions, forms of action. They are perceived as actions, which affect entities of 'knowing'. Such actions are actions the entity does not 'wish' to have forced upon it. In the pragmatic sense, there is little arguing such actions occur within the physical, but what of such actions existing outside the physical? Outside the physical 'actions bound by the laws of determinism' do not exist for to exist and be 'effective' in an 'affective' manner actions bound by the laws of determinism must have a medium of action. Such a median is the physical itself. Without the physical, abstraction as well as any entity of pure abstractual existence need not submit to unsolicited actions of other purely abstractual existence.

With this in mind, we can examine the concept of divine foreknowledge as 'the' ultimate form of action bound by the laws of determinism. Abstractual existence is what determinism lies 'within'


and the abstract is the means and the location within which established consciousness, the individual itself, exists timelessly and within which established consciousness, the individual, understands its very timelessness.

When observing human behavior and interactions, it becomes obvious where free will does not lie. While free will may lie not only within actions bound by the laws of nature, and within actions bound by the laws of determinism, and within actions bound as states of being, free will in the purest sense lies 'within' itself, within the entity itself.

With this in mind, we come to the concept of free will itself:

Potentiality: the need 'for' a location of free will

It is the 'entity', which 'performs' the action not the 'region'. Thus, the previous diagram needs to be expanded to include 'entities' within the abstract, to include units of knowing of what is uniquely perceived and uniquely experienced. As such, the diagram becomes:



Now we are ready to discuss the issue of free will and determinism existing simultaneously in two versus one location.

The potential ‘to be’, action bound by the laws of free will, tends to establish self preservation as ‘the’ ultimate form of action since the physical existence is what free will lies ‘within’ and since the physical is the means by which and the location within which virgin consciousness, the individual itself, emerges and expands its very self.


Action bound by the laws of free will is not an ‘absolute’, rather action bound by the laws of free will are actions that we ‘perceive to be occurring’:

Perceive to be occurring:

- a. Perceive: active
- b. to be: passive
- c. occurring: active


This state, the passive sandwiched between states of the active, replicates a dynamic metaphysical systems as opposed to static metaphysical systems

Dynamic metaphysical system: the individual *acting within* God




So why is this a 'dynamic' metaphysical system? It is dynamic because it provides a means for 'growth'. All is 'known' except 'what is to be'.

Static metaphysical system:




So why is this a 'static' metaphysical system? It is static because it provides no means for 'growth'. All is 'known'.


With this in mind, once again we come back to:




We will now dissolve the confinement of the border in order to remove the confusion of oil having an affinity to its container. As such, we obtain




We then create 'a' system by adding a boundary, which has no affinity for either oil or water. We do so simply for convenience. We thus obtain:




We then call oil by its correct symbolic name and do the same for water.



We then simplify using Ockham's razor:



If we then create a 'location for free will to function within a realm of space and time, we then obtain



Once again we come back to the model of the individual *acting within* God.

Nothing: the need 'for' a location of nothing

We have discussed the concepts regarding the existence of free will and the existence of 'divine foreknowledge'. We have discussed the concepts regarding a 'location' for free will and a 'location' for 'divine foreknowledge'. The natural extension of such dialectic would appear to move into the direction of examining the existence of 'nothingness' and the 'location' for 'nothingness'.


To move into the direction of such a discussion, however, would deprive us of completing the task at hand. The task at hand is finalizing our understanding as to how we can reasonably and rationally resolve the paradox regarding the simultaneous existence of 'free will' and 'divine foreknowledge'.

The issue regarding ‘nothingness’ is extremely important and is not to be ignored. As such, the examination of ‘nothingness’ will be examined in the Tractate 4: Copernicus. Why discuss the issue of ‘nothingness’ within the Tractate 4: Copernicus? We will examine the concept of ‘nothingness’ within the Copernicus Tractate because it is Copernicus who unwittingly led us away from understanding nothingness itself.

The Book of Divine Foreknowledge

Boethius’ system introduces us to the Book of Divine Foreknowledge:

Hidden deep within the ‘Book’ is free will



Within the book, one is free to make choices of their own preference but the choices are already ‘known’ by the ultimate Knowing, ‘known’ by ‘Omniscience’.

Religions would suggest the book is a form of encyclopedia of the whole; the book is a source of all knowledge.

If the book is a source of all knowledge, then Boethius is correct in his assumptions regarding the limits of men. If such is the case, then humanity can perceive of paradoxes whose solutions will never be known to humanity due to the limits 'placed' upon humanity not by itself but rather due to limits 'placed' upon humanity by a 'superior' Being.

If we find a means of resolving the contradicting paradox regarding the simultaneous existence of divine foreknowledge and free will, then we will, for the present, have removed the limits humanity places upon itself. If we can find an alternative solution to Boethius' principle relegating humanity to a 'limited' status, then we will be ready to move on and free philosophy and metaphysics of its present constraints, thus opening the doors of not only truly new and exciting philosophical and metaphysical perceptual developments but we will have opened the doors of truly new and exciting cosmological and ontological perceptual developments as well.

This then leaves us with discussing the remaining two possibilities:

Which came first the chicken or the egg?

Which came first determinism or free will?

This question is very similar to the question, which surfaced in Tractate 1: Zeno and Seamlessness. In this Tractate, the question arose: Does the abstract exist 'within' the physical or does the physical 'exist' within the abstract?

The Location of Free Will

Perceived 'free will' located 'within' the physical:

We understand free will to apply to active forms of actions. Previously we categorized actions into two forms:

Forms of action:

Passive:


1. State of being
2. Actions bound by the laws of nature

Active:

3. Actions bound by the laws of free will
4. Actions bound by the laws of determinism

Since the two forms of actions: states of being and actions bound by the laws of nature are actions we do not perceive as being actions generated by forms of consciousness, we will set them aside and concentrate upon the other forms of action, free will and determinism.

Free will 'within' the physical:




And it is within the physical we perceive abstraction to exist. Love, hate, jealousy, joy, awe, inspiration, knowledge, consciousness of consciousness,


But what of:

Free will 'within the abstract

Since free will is an abstract concept we will use the same geometric configuration to represent abstraction:




If free will is to be free will, the individual must be the individual and as such, multiplicity becomes:




So it is, we come back again to the whole being the sum of its parts yet being the whole, having its own distinct identity. Thus giving rise, once again, to our understanding that in this type of metaphysical perception the whole is 'greater' than the sum of its parts.

The parts are original entities of 'knowing' having experienced originally within the physical. As such, it is more accurate to portray the latter diagram as:



Where then is free will found in relation to the physical? It is found 'within' the physical just as it is found 'within' the abstract. As such, we obtain:



And what of the passive actions categorized as: states of being? These actions are represented by the black boundary lines of the three forms of action symbolized by the small square, the circle, and the large rectangle.

The location of Determinism

The large rectangle:

The latter diagram defines the location of determinism. Determinism is found in the whole, the large rectangle.

Entities of 'knowing' can travel 'within' the whole as they so choose and experience everything including all abstractions they so desire to experience for they are no longer confined by the restraints of time and distance. 'Knowing' of all entities is open to all to experience for the abstract cannot be hidden from the abstract.

The whole is the whole and is 'knowing' of its wholeness. So it is the whole is the sum of all its parts in addition to being an entity in and of itself.

The whole grows with the growth of virgin 'knowing' and this 'new' 'knowing' adds to the whole.

Sequentiality is not an issue of the whole, for sequentiality is a function of time and distance and since time and distance are not an innate characteristic of the whole of abstraction, ordinal sequentiality are not innate characteristics of the whole.

Both the whole and the individual entities of 'knowing' are incapable of awareness of what is not and what is not is what 'virgin knowing' is to become through free will.


The circle:

The latter diagram defines the location of determinism. Determinism is found in the physical, the circle, both through actions bound by the laws of nature and actions bound by the laws of determinism.

The square:

The latter diagram defines the location where determinism is not. Determinism is not found in the square. Determinism is not found 'within' free will.

The misnomer of 'free will'



If 'free will' was established as action independent the action of determinism then is free will really 'free will' or just another form of determinism? If such were the case, then free will would have been established by determinism and thus free will would have been established through the act of determinism. If free will is found within determinism then was free will established 'after' the fact of determinism's existence?

On the other hand, perhaps 'free will' void determinism initiated determinism. Perhaps determinism was established as a 'storage' location for free will.

At this point in time, it cannot be determined which of the two, free will or determinism, came first. Nor would it seem, are we capable of determining if neither is the case. We are presently incapable of determining if one came before the other or if the two 'came' into existence simultaneously.

In actuality, the three options regarding which came first, free will, determinism, or both simultaneously, are not as impossible to discuss as one might think.

The third choice:

Simultaneous emergence of free will and determinism would suggest an existence before either form of 'active action', determinism or free will, existed. But is it possible for there to be a form of action, other than either passive action or active action. Is it possible for there to be a form of action other than the four forms of action we discussed: States of being, actions bound by the laws of nature, actions bound by the laws of determinism, and actions bound by the laws of free will?

If one wishes to proceed with such an argument one must be able to describe such action in order for this dialectic to proceed. . In the absence of such a description, we will let the possibility of such a possibility stand but we will ignore the dialectic of such a possibility until the description of some form of action, other than passive or active action, emerges. Having set such a possibility aside, we should then proceed with the dialectic

A point of information: This work regarding The War and Peace of a New Metaphysical Perception will not ignore the argument: what came 'before' free will and determinism. The

immersion into this very concept initiates the totality of the last chapter: Chapter 18: The End of the Beginning – Theoretical Metaphysics.

This then leaves us with discussing the remaining two possibilities:

Which came first the chicken or the egg?

Which came first determinism or free will?

This question is, in essence, no different from the question, which surfaced in Tractate 1: Zeno and Seamlessness. In this Tractate, the question arose: Does the abstract exist ‘within’ the physical or does the physical ‘exist’ within the abstract? One may refer to Tractate 1 if one chooses but rather than reiterate what came before, it is time to begin to address a summary of the issue of free will versus determinism.

It appears an extraordinary number of concepts will be addressed in the manner of ‘refer to what was previously...’ or addressed as ‘later we will...’. Unfortunately, this is a correct observation. Space and time are both limited by the concept known as a ‘Tractate’. It is the concept of space and time, which confines us to the parameter of limited discussions. It is the concept of ‘tractate’, which limits us to staying on task rather than chaotically diverting our attention away from the discussion at hand, which is understanding how it is we became confined, caged, in the first place. It is only through understanding the concept of how it is we are ‘caged’ by limitations of creative understanding that we can begin to explore the means of unlocking the door of our cage and stepping ‘out’ into the realm of free space once again.

Part of unlocking the door to this cage of philosophical confinement lies in exploding the perception of Boethius:

‘It is not allowed to man to comprehend in thought all the ways of the divine work.’¹⁰

Perceptions generated by Boethius lead to slamming shut the doors of perceptual ‘knowing’ and locking it shut. Free will lies behind the door labeled: ‘It is not for us to know.’ lead to multiple perceptions such as: ‘If man were intended to fly, God would have given him wings.’

The misnomer regarding free will lies in the perception: Some people think free will is never interrupted or superceded. But as we have seen, there are two forms of action which often interfere with free will:

1. Action bound by the laws of nature
2. Actions bound by the laws of determinism

Actions bound by the laws of nature often supercede the desire to accomplish the actions bound by the laws of free will.

Actions bound by the laws of determinism often supercede the desire to accomplish actions bound by the laws of free will.

The ultimate extreme of both forms of action, actions bound by the laws of nature and actions bound by the laws of determinism, is exemplified as action which terminates actions bound by the laws of free will found within individual entities existing through action bound by the laws of the state of being.

Letting go

It is time for us to let go of Boethius' metaphysical system. Previously we could not let go of Boethius' perceptions because we had nothing to fill the vacuum 'letting go' would create. We could not let go of the concept:

'The point of greatest importance here is this: the superior manner of knowledge includes the inferior, but it is quite impossible for the inferior to rise to the superior.'...

It is now time to let go of such perceptions. We have an alternative set before us regarding a perception of free will and determinism. We have an alternative that provides the means of 'letting go' the concept that it is humanity who defines what it is we cannot 'know'. It is time to file Boethius' concept regarding the 'limits' of humanity, the limits of 'being s' found within the universe, away as a part of the annals of history:

We come to the first paragraph of this Tractate:

Free will confined within the boundaries of determinism is simply an illusion of free will.

'There can be little question that Boethius, more than any other philosophic author, helped the great Schoolmen to retain a general comprehensive view of the world as a whole, in spite of the distractions of their minute inquiries.'¹¹

At this point in time, philosophers have not resolved the issue. On the other hand, at this point in time, philosophers have refused to embrace the rationality of a 'whole' enveloping the physical. As time has demonstrated, two and a half millennium of time, we cannot resolve some of our greatest philosophical paradoxes without the use of both the rationality and the reasonableness of such concept.

Until philosophy moves to the level of accepting its primary tool, reason, as being itself a legitimate tool, the paradoxes will remain paradoxes. Is the lack of being able to resolve the major paradoxes addressed within the Tractates of the work, *The War and Peace of a New Metaphysical Perception*, a negative? It is only a negative if one believes stagnation is a negative.

Why is it a 'negative' action to take the position: It is unimportant to resolve the issue of free will versus divine foreknowledge. Why is clinging to the concept that the relationship between free will and divine foreknowledge found within Boethius' paradox a negative? Why is refusing to face perhaps one of the most influential paradoxes to confront us for the last twenty-five hundred years a potential negative? The answer to all these questions lies in our abhorrence toward the concept that we are stagnant specie.

We have addressed three forms of paradoxes: Tractate 1: seamlessness versus multiplicity, Tractate 2: one first truth versus multiple first truths, and now Tractate 3: free will versus divine foreknowledge. In each instance it has been argued that we can resolve the paradox through the means of expanding our perceptual understanding reason, metaphysics, philosophy, can provide.

In the past, we have been unable to resolve many philosophical paradoxes because the greatest paradoxes deal with abstractions and abstractions are not 'physical' in nature. As such, these paradoxes are not measurable for they are not items characterized by time and space.

Abstractions are capable of comprehending time and space but time and space are not capable of comprehending abstractions.

To resolve abstractual paradoxes embracing characteristics of time and space, one presently has only the tool of reason at one's disposal.

Until we resolve the major paradoxes encompassing the interrelationships of the abstractual and the physical, the paradoxes will remain. The negative aspect of a state of stagnation is the state within which such a state leaves us, units of knowing. We remain mired at an established level of understanding.

Are there other levels of understanding awaiting us? Indubitably, and we, you and I, you and I together, will be left wanting in terms of rising to this new level of understanding until we find the means of resolving the primitive paradoxes presently facing us.

So what next? One thing is certain; we have not come to the end of our understanding regarding the issues of great paradoxes facing humanity. Our next step is to step 'out' beyond the issue of space itself.

It must be stated at this point that such a statement is a misconception for we cannot step 'out' beyond a region of infinite space. As we shall see in Tractate 4: Copernicus, we can only step 'into' a realm of infinite space and as we shall see, it is only by confining ourselves that we can free ourselves of confinement.

So it is free will may very well not be found 'within' 'the' System ' but rather free will may very well be found 'within' 'a' system 'itself 'contained' 'within' a 'greater' System.

Are we creating a paradox? It is only a paradox if one does not understand the solution to the paradox Copernicus espoused the paradox of Centricism versus non-Centricism.

We now understand that

Boethius is a vital link in moving our perceptual understanding forward regarding the ‘system’ being filled with determinism, into that of being ‘the’ system filled with both determinism and free will. As such, both free will and determinism, with the help of Boethius, now have a location within which each dominates. As such, the understanding regarding the role of free will and determinism as well as the understanding regarding the interrelationship between free will and determinism no longer remain in a state of confusion. Even more interestingly, the existence of such an interrelationship is not only recognized, as a significant aspect of the ‘larger’ system but it is now understood how free will and determinism interact one with the other.

¹ Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy*, Penguin Books, 1969, England, Victor Watts, Merton College, Oxford.

² Oxford: *Concise Science Dictionary*, 1996.

³ Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy*, Penguin Books, 1969, England, Victor Watts, Merton College, Oxford.

⁴ **Question:** I understand what you mean by this. However, an ambiguity still remains. In quantum theory, many “theoretical” particles are “expected” to exist, even though they have yet to be measured. **Answer:** True, however, science has the perception that if it exists, it is measurable. It may not be measurable today; it will be measurable sometime in the future. Science attempts to validate ‘theoretical’ particles existing by finding a means of proving their existence through measurement.

⁵ Boethius: *The Consolation of Philosophy*, IV, 6

⁶ Boethius: *The Consolation of Philosophy*, Penguin Classics, 1969, p167 – 169.

⁷ *Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion*, William L. Reese, 1980.

⁸ *Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion*, William L. Reese, 1980.

⁹ *Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion*, William L. Reese, 1980.

¹⁰ Boethius: *The Consolation of Philosophy*, IV, 6

¹¹ Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy*, Penguin Books, 1969, England, Victor Watts, Merton College, Oxford.